

How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for Russia's military failure during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: From the Memoirs of Sergei Witte, which were written in 1912 and kept secret. They were published in the US in 1921. One of the Tsar's Ministers and Advisors, Witte served as Minister of Finance and a senior diplomat, therefore he understood Russia's economy and understood developments in the rest of the world.

In February 1905 our army, led by General Kuropatkin, suffered a striking defeat near Mukden. The battle was remarkable, both for the number of troops involved and for the severity of our defeat – the worst, as far as I can recall, in the history of our army. Because the debacle at Mukden<sup>1</sup> revealed General Kuropatkin's complete inadequacy as commander-in-chief, he was replaced by the aged poorly educated General Linevich. The chief reason for our failures against Japan was our lack of preparation for a war which we had provoked.

Our defeats, especially that at Mukden, roused all levels of the Russian population, in varying ways to be sure, against the government as the regime had shown itself to be weak and incompetent. The revolutionary mood spread from Russia to our troops in Asia.

My view that victory against Japan was no longer possible was supported by an article in *Russian Word*<sup>2</sup>, yet, with usual optimism the Tsar believed that the new leadership could change the course of the war.

Source 4: From General Aleksey Kuropatkin's book *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, published in 1909. Kuropatkin led the Russian Army in the early phases of the war but was demoted following a series of military defeats.

Belief in God, devotion to the Tsar, love of Russia, are the factors which have, up until now, turned the mass of soldiers into one family, and have made them fearless and obedient. But these principles have latterly been shaken amongst the people. The result was, of course, felt in the war with Japan. I was chiefly noticeable in an increase in the number of men who were slack and insubordinate, who criticised their seniors, and generally exercised a bad influence in the army. Such men could only be controlled by fear. Deterioration in the discipline of the whole nation was made worse by the abolition of corporal punishment in the army. We therefore had no effective punishment for many offences.

Taking into consideration the peculiar conditions under which the war was conducted, owing to the lack of national sympathy in the struggle, and to the anti-government propaganda which influenced all ranks of the army, this weakening of the disciplinary powers was ill-advised.

The unpopularity of the war also affected the steadiness of the troops in action. The wholesale criticism on the whole army by the Press, the abuse of the officers in newspapers, particularly of those in high command, and the incitement to mutiny from propaganda made the troops cowardly.

<sup>1</sup> Mukden, a region of East Asia where Russian troops were defeated by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.

<sup>2</sup> *Russian Word*, a radical newspaper that published articles by liberals and socialists. It was banned for most of 1905.

How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for Russia's military failure during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905?

Introduction:

Paragraph 1:

Strengths of content:

Limitations of content:

Paragraph 2:

Strengths of NOP:

Limitations of NOP:

Paragraph 3:

Strengths of content:

Limitations of content:

Paragraph 4:

Strengths of NOP:

Limitations of NOP:

Conclusion:

A

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the aims and priorities of Russian liberals in 1904-05?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: From the programme of the League of Liberation, 1904.

The first and main aim of the League of Liberation is the political liberation of Russia. The League considers political liberty in even its most minimal form as utterly incompatible with the autocratic character of the Russian monarchy, and for that reason will seek before all else the abolition of autocracy and the establishment in Russia of a constitutional regime. In determining the concrete forms a constitutional regime will take in Russia, the League of Liberation will make all efforts to have political problems resolved in the spirit of extensive democracy. Putting political demands in the forefront, the League also recognises as essential the definition of its attitude in principle to social-economic problems. In the realm of social-economic policy, the League of Liberation will make the direct goal of its activity the defence of the interest of the toiling masses.

Source 4: From Milyukov's speech to the Kadet Party's first conference, October 1905.

Our party will never defend the interests of the landowners and industrialists at the cost of the interests of the toiling masses. Between us and our - we would like to say not opponents, but associates on the Left - there exists a certain boundary. We do not join in with their demands for a democratic republic and the socialisation of the means of production. Some of us do not support these watchwords because we regard them as generally unacceptable, others because they regard them as standing beyond the bounds of practical politics. As long as it is possible to move toward a common goal together despite this difference of motives, both groups will act as a single whole: any attempt to emphasise the demands just mentioned will result in immediate schism.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the aims and priorities of Russian liberals in 1904-05?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

A

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the political tensions that existed in Russia in 1906?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: From a despatch sent by the United States' ambassador to Russia to his superiors in Washington, May 1906.

On the left of the throne were members of the Duma, in every conceivable costume, the peasants in rough clothes and long boots, merchants and tradespeople in frock coats, lawyers in dress suits, priests in long garb and almost equally long hair. On the opposite side of the hall were officers in braided uniforms, courtiers with decorations, generals and members of the Council of State.

As a quarter of 2, the Emperor approached. In watching the Duma members I was surprised to note that many of them did not even return the bows of His Majesty, some giving an awkward nod, others staring him coldly in the face, showing no enthusiasm, and even almost sullen indifference. He then proceeded to read his address. When he finished there was a tremendous outbreak of applause, but limited almost entirely to the right side of the hall, with the Duma members remaining quiet.

The contrast between those on the left and those on the right was the greatest one could possibly imagine, one being a real representation of the different classes of the great Empire and the other of what the autocracy and bureaucracy has been.

Source 4: From the diary of Grand Duchess Xenia, 27 and 30 April 1906. Grand Duchess Xenia was Nicholas II's sister. Note that, in Orthodox Christianity, crossing oneself is a gesture of piety or reverence: Grand Duchess Xenia thought that Duma members had failed to show the tsar proper respect.

Sat with us were members of the State Council and high officials, to the left the members of the Duma, who included several men with repulsive faces and insolent disdainful expressions. They neither crossed themselves nor bowed, but stood with their hands behind their backs or in their pockets, looking sombrely at everyone and everything. But among the peasants there were such wonderful faces.

Nicky read the speech standing, in a loud, steady voice. Every word penetrated the soul - tears welled up in the throat. He spoke so well, saying just what was needed, asking everyone to come to his aid. When he finished a cheer broke out which was taken up by everyone.

The Duma is such filth, such a nest of revolutionaries, that it's disgusting and shaming for the rest of Russia in front of the whole world.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the political tensions that existed in Russia in 1906?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

## Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2 How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the problems facing the Tsarist system during the First World War?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

## C2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

## Sources for use with Question 2.

**Source 3:** From a speech made by Paul Milyukov, the leader of the liberal Kadet Party, to the Fourth Duma on 1 November 1916. Here, Milyukov criticises the Tsar's government.

This present government has sunk beneath the level on which it stood during normal times in Russian life. And now the gulf between us and that government has grown wider and become impassable. Today we are aware that with this government we cannot legislate, and we cannot, with this government, lead Russia to victory. We are telling this government, as the declaration of the [Progressive] Bloc stated: We shall fight you, we shall fight you with all legitimate means until you go. 5

When the Duma declares again and again that the home front must be organised for a successful war and the government continues to insist that to organise the country means to organise a revolution, and consciously chooses chaos and disorganisation – is this stupidity or treason? We have many reasons for being discontented with the government. But all these reasons boil down to one general one: the incompetence and evil intentions of the present government. We shall fight until we get a responsible government. Cabinet members must agree unanimously as to the most urgent tasks. They must agree and be prepared to implement the programme of the Duma majority. They must rely on this majority, not just in the implementation of this programme, but in all their actions. 10 15

**Source 4:** From a Tsarist police report, written in October 1916. Here, the report considers conditions in wartime Petrograd.

In the opinion of the spokesmen of the labour group of the Central War Industries Committee\*, the industrial proletariat of the capital is on the verge of despair. The labour group believes that the smallest outbreak, due to any pretext, will lead to uncontrollable riots with tens of thousands of victims. Indeed the stage for such outbreaks is more than set: the economic position of the masses is distressing. 20

Even if we assume that wages have increased 100 per cent, the cost of living in the meantime has risen by an average of 300 per cent. There is the impossibility of obtaining, even for cash, many foodstuffs and essentials, the waste of time involved in spending hours waiting in line at stores, and the increasing death rate due to inadequate diet and insanitary housing. All these conditions have created such a situation that the mass of industrial workers are quite ready to let themselves go to the wildest excesses of a hunger riot. 25

The closing of all labour meetings and trade unions make the working masses, led by the more advanced and revolutionary-minded elements, assume an openly hostile attitude towards the government. They also protest with all the means at their disposal against the continuation of the war. 30

\* Central War Industries Committee – a non-governmental body set up in 1915 to help with armaments production. It had a wide membership, including industrialists, zemstva representatives and workers.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the problems facing the Tsarist system during the First World War?

Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

- A** How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the nature of the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet in the period between February and April 1917?
- Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: Telegram from War Minister Guchkov to General Alexeev, commander-in-chief of the Russian army, 9 March 1917.

The Provisional Government has no power of any kind and its orders are carried out only to the extent that this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which controls the most essential strands of actual power, insofar as the troops, railways and post and telegraph services are in its hands. One can assert bluntly that the Provisional Government exists only as long as it is permitted to do so by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In particular, in the military department, it is possible at present to issue only such orders as basically do not contradict the decisions of the above-mentioned Soviet.

Source 4: N.K. Chkheidze, the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, addressing a delegation of students who came to the Soviet with a banner hailing the Provisional Government, 24 March 1917.

I see on your banner the slogan 'Greetings to the Provisional Government', but for you it can be no secret that many of its members, on the eve of the Revolution, were trembling and lacked faith in the Revolution. You extend greetings to it. You seem to believe that it will carry high the new standard. If this is so, remain in your belief, As for us, we will support it for as long as it realises democratic principles. We know, however, that our government is not democratic, but bourgeois. Follow carefully its activity. We shall support all of its measures which tend towards the common good, but all else we shall unmask because at stake is the future of Russia.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the nature of the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet in the period between February and April 1917?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

**Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924**

**Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.**

- 2 How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

**(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)**

**Source 3:** From a letter written by Lenin to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, 14 September 1917.

On July 3-4\* it could have been argued that the correct thing for the Bolsheviks to do was to take power, for our enemies would in any case have accused us of revolution and ruthlessly treated us as rebels. However, to have decided in favour of taking power at that time would have been wrong, because the conditions for the victory of the revolution did not exist.

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(1) We still lacked the support of the working class that is the vanguard of the revolution. We still did not have a majority among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and Moscow. Now we have a majority in both Soviets. It was created solely by the history of July and August, by the experience of the ruthless treatment handed out to the Bolsheviks, and by the experience of the Kornilov revolt.

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(2) There was no country-wide revolutionary upsurge at that time. There is now, after the Kornilov revolt; the situation in the provinces and the assumption of power by the Soviets in many localities prove this.

(3) Therefore, an insurrection on July 3-4 would have been a mistake; we could not have retained power either physically or politically. We could not have retained it physically even though Petrograd was at times in our hands, because at that time our workers and soldiers would not have fought and died for Petrograd. We could not have retained power politically on July 3-4 because, before the Kornilov revolt, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd.

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\*July 3-4 - the July Days

**Source 4:** From Alexander Kerensky, *The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion*, published 1919. Kerensky was Prime Minister of the Provisional Government at the time of the Kornilov Affair.

The Kornilov adventure was the prologue to the Bolshevik coup. Had there been no Kornilov affair in August, there would not have been a Bolshevik takeover in October 1917. And that is really the great crime, the unforgivable sin against our native country of those naïve dreamers, skilful politicians and bold adventurers who undertook to save Russia by means of a 'White General'. In his proclamation to the Russian people, General Kornilov, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, stated that the Provisional Government acted under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets. Whether Kornilov himself laboured under a delusion, or lied, is of no importance. But, there was nothing, nothing whatever, of the kind at the time in the Soviets, which were clearly leaning to the right.

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Before the Kornilov rising there had not been a Bolshevik majority in a single Soviet. Nevertheless, Kornilov proved himself to be a remarkable prophet. Within a week after the Kornilov rising, the Soviets were taken over by the Bolsheviks. Then everywhere Bolshevik majorities came into being, and there began under the motto 'All power to the Soviets' the fatal conflict of the unrestrained masses against responsible leadership and order in Russia.

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How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of the Kornilov affair on the Bolsheviks?		
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Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
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Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

**A** How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of the policy of War Communism in Russia in 1918-1921?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: From an article in the independent socialist newspaper *New Life*, 19 April 1918. *New Life's* publisher was the famous Russian novelist and playwright, Maxim Gorky. *New Life* was shut down by the Bolsheviks in July 1918.

News is arriving of the bread war which is now taking place in Voronezh, Smolensk, Tambov, Riazan, Simbirsk, Kharkov, Ufa, Orenburg, Kursk and a number of other provinces. Armed detachments of Red Guards and hired soldiers are roaming over villages and hamlets in quest of bread, making searches, laying traps with more or less success. Sometimes they return with bread; at other times they come back carrying the dead bodies of their comrades who fell in the fight with the peasants. Many of the villages are now well-armed, and seldom does a bread expedition end without victims. At the first report of a requisitioning expedition, the whole district is mobilised and comes to the defence of the neighbouring village.

Source 4: Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, published in 1951. Serge (1890-1947), the son of a Russian political exile, was a one-time anarchist who returned to Russia in 1919 and joined the Bolsheviks. In the winter of 1920-21, he was based in Petrograd.

The rations issued were minute: black bread, or sometimes a few cupfuls of oats instead; a few herrings each month, a small quantity of sugar for people in the 'first category' (workers and soldiers) and none at all for the third category (non-workers). The words of St. Paul that were posted up everywhere, 'He that doth not work, neither shall he eat' became ironical, because if you wanted any food you really had to resort to the black market instead of working. In the dead factories, the workers spent their time making knives out of bits of machinery, or shoe-soles out of the conveyor belts, to barter them on the underground market. If you wished to procure a little flour, butter or meat from the peasants who brought these things illicitly into town, you had to have cloth or articles of some kind to exchange. Winter was torture for the townspeople: no heating, no lighting and the ravages of famine. Children and feeble old folk died in their thousands. Typhus was carried everywhere by lice, and took a frightful toll.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the impact of the policy of War Communism in Russia in 1918-1921?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

A

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

**Source 3:** From Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memoirs*, published 1931. Pares was a regular visitor to Russia before 1914 and served as British Military Observer to the Russian Army during the First World War. He was also in Russia during the civil war. Pares was a prominent academic specialising in Russian history.

It was not a surprise to me when Lenin declared his New Economic Policy. Of course, a man of such determination would never have given the signal for 'economic retreat', which meant in plain words a retreat from Communism, until he was compelled to. There were already signs enough that the development of the country was going completely against his theory. This retreat came with the victory in war over the Whites and their allies. Until then, Soviet Russia was like a besieged city and could only have a hand-to-mouth policy in economics as in anything else. But directly they had won their war, the Communists had to recognise the complete economic breakdown caused by the total application of their theory. This fact was recognised very sincerely by the Commissar for Industry, Rykov, in a report to a Congress of National Economic Councils in Moscow in January 1920.

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Though the system had been applied during a civil war, this was, and was meant to be, not merely War Communism, such as is appropriate to a besieged city, but instead pure Communism. Its failure was self-evident.

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**Source 4:** From a speech by Lenin delivered at the 9th Congress of Soviets in December 1921.

So far, comrades, we have handled things very, very badly in this economic area, as we must frankly admit. We must recognise this shortcoming in policy and not try to cover it up. We must do everything possible to eliminate it and understand that the foundation of our New Economic Policy lies in the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. There are only two ways in which proper relations between the working class and the peasants can be established in future. If large scale industry is flourishing, it can immediately supply the small peasants with a sufficient amount of goods, or more than previously. In these circumstances, a proper relationship can then be established between manufactured goods and the supply of surplus agricultural goods coming from the peasants. Then, the peasants, including the non-Party peasants, will acknowledge, by virtue of this experience, that this new system is better than the capitalist system. We speak of a flourishing large-scale industry, which is able to supply all the goods the peasants are in urgent need of, and this possibility now exists.

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How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

A

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894-1924

Study Sources 3 and 4 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

- 2 How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War?

Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)

**Source 3:** From an article by Vladimir Lenin, published December 1919. Here, the Bolshevik leader discusses the Russian Civil War.

In November 1917, the Bolsheviks had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat. In Petrograd and Moscow, the two principal commercial and industrial centres of Russia, the Bolsheviks had an overwhelming, decisive superiority of forces. The armed forces were half Bolshevik. The Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917, compared with the Civil War, are revealing. It was precisely in the districts where the Bolsheviks polled the lowest percentage of votes in November 1917 that the counter-revolutionary movements had the greatest success. In those districts, where the proletariat's influence was weakest, the rule of Kolchak and Denikin lasted for months.

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The population in those districts turned against the Bolsheviks. To promote the international revolution and protect its centre in Russia, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and thus offended bourgeois patriotic sentiments. The peasants in places with the largest stocks of surplus grain were unhappy because the Bolsheviks showed that they would firmly transfer those surplus stocks to the state at fixed prices. The peasants in the Urals, Siberia and the Ukraine turned to Kolchak and Denikin.

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Further, the experience of Kolchak and Denikin 'democracy', about which every writer shouted in the White press, showed the peasants that phrases about democracy and the Constituent Assembly served only to conceal the dictatorship of the landowners and capitalists. Another turn towards Bolshevism began and peasant revolts spread in the rear of Kolchak and Denikin. The peasants welcomed the Red troops as liberators.

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**Source 4:** From General William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure 1918-20*, published 1931. Graves commanded the American interventionist forces in Siberia during the Russian Civil War. Here, he reflects on General Kolchak and the White forces in Siberia.

At no time was there enough popular support behind Kolchak in Eastern Siberia for him to have lasted one month if all Allied support had been removed. Kolchak was suspected, not without reason, of Tsarist leanings. Certainly, he did not favour democracy. He hated, and in return was hated by, the Socialist Revolutionaries who at that time were far and away the largest political body in Siberia. From the first, his regime was distrusted and detested by all but the military clique who created it. Deepest and most ominous of all was the hostility of the common people, who received the White dictatorship with a mistrust and alarm that grew in intensity.

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All the old vices of the Tsarist regime came back. Floggings and shootings again became the basis of army organisation. The officers gambled, drank, and stole military supplies, while the men starved. The anti-democratic colour of the White government became clearer every day. Representatives of workmen were no longer admitted to official receptions, and the Whites' agrarian policy plainly showed that the clock had been set back to pre-revolutionary times. Meanwhile a White Terror began which was far worse than anything perpetrated by the Reds. Not merely suspected Bolsheviks, but Socialists of any kind, even Liberals and Democrats, were slaughtered in thousands.

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How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		

A

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the failure of the Whites in the Russian Civil War?

Explain your answer using, using both sources, the information given about them and your knowledge of the historical context. (20 marks)

Source 3: Reminiscences of Ekaterina Olitskaia, who in 1919 was a young SR sympathiser living in the southern Russian city of Kursk.

The rumours concerning Kolchak and Yudenich were followed by rumours of an offensive by General Denikin. Denikin's army was moving towards us, and moving incredibly fast. The Communist press talked about the outrages perpetrated by the Whites, about their ties to foreign invaders, about the estate and factory owners who followed the Denikin army, about the return of the land and factories to the capitalists, and about atrocities, floggings, hangings and anti-Jewish pogroms. All this I could believe, but they also said that the SRs were supporting General Denikin and his army. This I absolutely refused to believe.

Source 4: Paul Milyukov, the Kadet leader, commenting on Denikin's rule in southern Russia in *Russia Today and Tomorrow*, published in 1922. Milyukov was in southern Russia in 1918 acting as a political adviser to Generals Kornilov and Alexeev, but went into foreign exile in early 1919.

The newcomers who joined Denikin's army at the time of its growing success had no scruples against making up for their mockingly low pay by speculating with army supplies or even by looting the population. Plunder, not only by individuals, but by whole units, became almost a profession. Bribery, drunken orgies and every kind of violence became customary, especially in the large cities and among the chief commanders.

But this is not all. Former landowners were also coming back with the army. Each one endeavoured to return to his own former estate, which had been taken by the peasants. Occasionally the landlord was intent on revenge for the mistreatment or murder of some members of his family by the peasants. His return was then coupled with relentless reprisals. This was enough for the peasant to come to the conclusion that the estates of the nobles were to be taken from him by the new power.

In a civil war everything depends on the state of mind of the population living under competing systems of government. We have seen how favourable that state of mind was for the liberators and how much it changed owing to the utterly bad tactics of the White armies.

How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the failures of the Whites in the Russian Civil War?

Introduction:

Paragraph 1:

Strengths of content:

Limitations of content:

Paragraph 2:

Strengths of NOP:

Limitations of NOP:

Paragraph 3:

Strengths of content:

Limitations of content:

Paragraph 4:

Strengths of NOP:

Limitations of NOP:

Conclusion:

How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917? Explain your answer, using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.

**Source 3:** From the Act of Abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, issued March 1917.

By the Grace of God, I, Nicholas II, Emperor of all the Russias, to all my faithful subjects make known:

In these days of terrible struggle against the foreign enemy, who has been trying for three years to impose its will upon our country, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on the ultimate course of this hard-fought war. The future of Russia, the honour of our heroic army, the welfare of the people and the whole future of our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price.

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This cruel foreign enemy is making his supreme effort, but we must ensure that the moment is at hand when our courageous army, working with our glorious allies, will overthrow the enemy once and for all.

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In these days, which are decisive for the existence of Russia, I think I should follow the voice of my conscience by enabling the closest co-operation of my people and the organisation of all their resources for the speedy achievement of victory.

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For these reasons, in agreement with the Duma of the Empire, I think it my duty to abdicate the Crown and give up the supreme power.

**Source 4:** From Alexander Kerensky, *The Road to the Tragedy*, published 1935. Here he considers Tsar Nicholas II's abdication.

When looking at this living mask of a ruler, I began to understand why the reins of government had slipped so easily out of Nicholas II's hands. He bore 'the burden of power' until the end. But, he would not fight for it: he had no wish to rule. Power, like everything else that was earthly and consequently humdrum, bored him, tired him, and no longer thrilled.

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He calmly laid aside his royal sceptre to take up a gardener's spade. He gave up the throne like handing over a troop of horses. He threw aside his imperial rule just as in his youth he tossed aside one splendid military uniform to put on another. And now, he found it an interesting experience to be without a uniform at all - just an ordinary citizen, free of all duties and obligations. Without any inner drama he stepped out into private life. 'It was God's will' he said. Indeed, all those who observed him closely during his 'captivity' assert unanimously that, throughout this period, the former Emperor was generally in a calm and even happy mood.

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How far could the historian make use of sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the reasons for the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917?		
Introduction:		
Paragraph 1:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 2:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Paragraph 3:	Strengths of content:	Limitations of content:
Paragraph 4:	Strengths of NOP:	Limitations of NOP:
Conclusion:		